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net impact of the increase in coordination is negative: it reduces market power,
prices and prots. In this case, by allowing for independent PMs ( = 0), a
multiproduct rm o¤sets the net unprotable e¤ect. Equation (32), however,
shows that a decentralized organizational structure may be optimal also in
case of oligopoly 21 , depending on size of the industry price index e¤ect.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the price-setting behavior of multiproduct rms in a dif-
ferentiated product market. The structure considered is one where large com-
panies o¤er either a set of close substitutes (market segmentation) or a set of
distant substitutes (market interlacing).
The modelling strategy of the paper is to allow for two di¤erent elasticities of
substitution: while  represents the intra-company elasticity of substitution,
 is the inter-company elasticity of substitution. The key feature of the model
is the possibility for multiproduct companies to choose their optimal internal
organizational structure, according to the relative size of these two parameters.
Each company, consisting of n divisions, may either set prices centrally (as
in the traditional approach), or alternatively, it may assign an independent
product manager to run each division. In other words, product managers of
the same company may behave either independently or cooperatively.
While the model does not consider either the proliferation or the product-
line selection decisions, it deals with multiproduct rmsprice decisions under
oligopolistic competition making use of conjectural variations. Its main pur-
pose has been to provide a microfounded answer about the question of whether
and when a system of product managers decentralized decisions is better than
a mechanism with a centralized general direction.
The paper has shown that coordination is always protable under market seg-
mentation; while under market interlacing, the strategy of relying on indepen-
dent product managers is protable when the standard monopolistic competi-
tion arises; it may also be protable with oligopolistic (Bertrand) competition
under some (not very restrictive) assumptions.
21With a not negligible price index e¤ect.
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